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CAUSATION IN PERSPECTIVE. 
ARE ALL CAUSAL CLAIMS 
EQUALLY WARRANTED? 
Erik Weber & Leen De Vreese  
ABSTRACT 
In a paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the truth 
value of causal judgments is perspective-relative (i.e. their truth value does not 
depend entirely on mind-independent structures). His arguments are confined to 
causation as difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, 
counterfactual and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly 
present Menzies’ arguments. Then we show that perspective-relativity also holds 
for causation in the sense of process theories. These parts of the paper prepare 
the ground for the topic we really want to investigate: we want to find out 
whether this perspective-relativity leads to an epistemic predicament with respect 
to causal claims. The potential epistemic predicament we consider is that all 
causal claims would be equally warranted. 
 
1. Introduction 
In paper ‘Causation in Context’ (2007) Peter Menzies has argued that the 
truth value of causal judgments is perspective-relative which means that 
their truth value does not depend entirely on mind-independent structures: 
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... the truth-value of causal judgments does not depend entirely on the 
mind-independent structures. The context-sensitive character of causal 
judgments indicates that their truth value is perspective-relative. (2007, p. 
193) 
 
Menzies arguments in his 2007 paper are confined to causation as 
difference making (a term he uses to cover probabilistic, counterfactual 
and regularity views of causation). In this paper we first briefly present 
Menzies’ arguments (Section 2). Then show that perspective-relativity 
also holds for causation in the sense of process theories (Sections 3-5). 
 Sections 2-5 reveal that there are different types of perspective-
relativity of the truth value of causal claims. In Section 6 we summarize 
them and clarify how they relate to each other. In Section 7 we 
investigate whether the first type of perspective-relativity that we will 
distinguish leads to the following epistemic predicament with respect to 
causal claims: 
 
(EPCC) For every causal claim we make, it is possible to formulate a 
conflicting causal claim that is equally warranted. 
 
In Section 8 and 9 we do the same for the other types of perspective-
relativity.  
 
2. The Perspective-Relativity of Causation 
as Difference-Making 
2.1 Let us look at two examples which Menzies uses to argue that “the 
truth conditions of causal statements are context-sensitive” (2007, p. 
194). His first example is the Indian Famine (2007, pp. 194-195 and 209-
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211). We discuss the example in such a way that it will be easy to 
compare Menzies’ claims with what we will do with respect to process 
causation in Sections 3-5. 
Consider a person A making the following claim: 
 
The famine in India in year x was caused by the drought, not by the 
failure of the government to build up food reserves. 
 
We also have B, who claims the opposite: 
 
The famine in India in year x was not caused by the drought, but by 
the failure of the government to build up food reserves. 
 
This disagreement can be explained by the fact that A and B have 
different perspectives. For instance, it is possible that A is trying to 
explain why there is a famine in India in year x but not in year y, and 
utters his claim in this context. If there was a drought in India in year x, 
but not in y, and if the Indian government did not build up food reserves 
in year x, nor in y, A’s claim is correct within his perspective. If B, on the 
other hand, utters his claim in the context of explaining why there was a 
famine in year x in India but not in Pakistan, his claim is also correct, 
provided that there was a drought both in India and Pakistan in year x and 
that the Pakistani government (contrary to the Indian government) did 
build up food reserves. 
Causation is used here in a counterfactual sense (one of the senses 
falling under the general label of “difference making”): the fact that a 
famine occurs in India (F) counterfactually depends on D (the fact that a 
drought occurs in India) and ¬R (the fact that the government did not 
126 E. WEBER & L. DE VREESE 
 
stockpile reserves of food). If the truth1 of a causal claim would be 
context-independent, that would entail the following:  
 
If two people disagree as to what causes (in the counterfactual sense) 
an event E, then at least one of them must be wrong. 
 
However, this claim must be rejected because there is another explanation 
for the disagreement: 
 
If two people disagree as to what causes (in the counterfactual sense) 
an event E, they may be explaining different contrasts. 
 
So it is possible that, if two people disagree as to causes, they both are 
right within their perspective (i.e. from the point of view of what they are 
trying to explain). Hence, the truth of claims about causes (in the 
counterfactual sense) depends on the perspective taken by the person who 
makes the claim. 
 
2.2 To clarify this further, we discuss a second example used by 
Menzies2: 
 
Let us suppose that a person is given a certain drug, ‘curit’, in order to 
cure him of a disease from which he is suffering. He can be given 
different doses of the drug: no dose, a moderate 100 mg dose, or a strong 
200 mg dose. The drug is known to be effective in large doses, but the 
cost and the risk of side-effects make it impractical to give a large dose to 
this patient; and so he is given a moderate dose of 100 mg. As it happens, 
                                                     
1
 Though Menzies does not explicitly define what he means with “truth” he 
uses it in the sense of “warranted assertability”. This is also what we mean with 
“truth”. 
2
 Menzies has adapted this example from Hitchcock 1996. 
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the patient recovers; and we ask ‘Did taking the moderate dose make a 
difference to the patient’s recovery?’ (2007, p. 204) 
 
The answer to the question at the end of the quote can be ‘yes’ or ‘no’, 
depending on which alternative cause one has in mind to contrast with the 
actual case: 
 
[T]here are two different counterfactual cases that contrast with the actual 
case in which the patient is given the moderate 100 mg: the case in which 
he is given no dose of curit and the case in which he is given the strong 
200 mg dose. (2007, p. 206) 
 
The claim 
 
Taking the moderate dose was a cause of the patient’s recovery. 
 
is correct if one has in mind the first contrast case (no dose). The claim 
 
Taking the moderate dose was not a cause of the patient’s recovery. 
 
is correct if one has in mind the second contrast case (strong dose). 
This example confirms a conclusion we have reached earlier, viz. that 
the following claim is false: 
 
If two people disagree as to what causes (in the counterfactual sense) 
an event E, then at least one of them must be wrong. 
 
On top of the explanation given above (the persons may be explaining 
different contrasts), we can now give an extra potential explanation of the 
disagreement: 
 
If two people disagree as to what causes (in the counterfactual sense) 
an event E, they may have different alternative causes in mind. 
128 E. WEBER & L. DE VREESE 
 
 
This second example confirms the conclusion that can be drawn from the 
first, viz. that the truth of causal claims (in the counterfactual sense) is 
context-dependent, and thus depends on the perspective taken by the 
person who makes the claim. 
 
2.3 To clarify Menzies’ position further, it is useful to compare it with the 
causal pluralism defended by Christopher Hitchcock: 
 
There are a great many cases where we are unclear about what causes 
what, even though we are clear about all the facts that are supposed to 
constitute causal relations. (2003, p. 21) 
 
Hitchcock maintains that this is due to the ambiguity of the meaning of 
“cause”. This ambiguity shows itself in the fact that different relations 
can underpin a single causal judgement: a counterfactual relation, a 
probabilistic relation, a causal process, etc. Hitchcock further argued that 
we are in specific cases most often clear about whether or not a 
counterfactual relation holds between two events, whether or not a 
probabilistic relation holds between the two events, whether or not a 
causal process binds the two events, etc. This nonetheless does not 
necessarily lead us to a firm answer to the question whether the two 
events stand in the causal relation. This becomes very clear when the 
different causal relations contradict each other: e.g., an event E 
counterfactually depends on an event C, but is not connected to C through 
a causal process. Since there is no fixed hierarchy between the different 
relations that can underpin our causal judgements, our final judgement 
will depend on the choice for one or another relation as the most 
important one in the context. Hitchcock further argues that we should 
stop trying to characterize the causal relation, given that – in practice – 
we do not need an answer to this question if we are clear about which of 
the different causal relations is present in a specific case. If we put 
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Hitchcock’s ideas in the format we have used above, one of the central 
tenets of Hitchcock is that the following claim is wrong: 
 
If two people disagree as to whether there is a causal relation between 
C and E, then at least one of them must be wrong. 
 
This claim is wrong because there is an alternative explanation: 
 
If two people disagree as to whether there is a causal relation between 
C and E, they may be using different concepts of causation. 
 
Menzies’ perspectivalism does not contradict this. He goes one step 
further, by denying the following: 
 
If two people using the same concept of causation disagree as to 
whether there is a causal relation between C and E, then at least one of 
them must be wrong. 
 
As we have seen in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, Menzies offers two alternative 
explanations: people may be explaining different contrasts (i.e., the 
contrasts they have in mind on the effect side differ) or have different 
alternative causes in mind (i.e., the contrasts they have in mind on the 
cause side are not the same). 
 
2.4 To understand Menzies’ position properly, it is important to point out 
that the use of the counterfactual conception of causation in the examples 
in Section 2.1 and 2.2 is not essential. Let us look back at the example 
from Section 2.2. We have person A claiming: 
 
Taking the moderate dose was a cause of the patient’s recovery. 
 
Person B claims: 
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Taking the moderate dose was not a cause of the patient’s recovery. 
 
If we assume that A and B both have a probabilistic conception of 
causation in mind (i.e. a conception according to which an earlier event 
causes a later one if the first raises the probability of the latter) their 
disagreement can be explained (like in Section 2.2 with the counterfactual 
conception) by the fact that they have different alternative causes in 
mind: the moderate dose raises the probability of recovery if one 
compares it to a situation where no drug is taken, while it does not raise 
the probability if one compares it to a situation where a strong dose is 
taken. So it does not matter which difference-making conception of 
causation we use: the truth value of claims about causal relations between 
events is perspective-relative on all difference-making conceptions of 
causation. That is what Menzies shows. In Sections 3-5 we will show that 
perspective-relativity of truth-values also applies to process causation as 
it has been described by Wesley Salmon: we will show that the truth 
value of claims about causal interactions and causal processes is 
perspective-relative. 
 
3. Causal Interactions and Frames of 
Reference 
3.1 The concept of causal interaction was introduced by Wesley Salmon 
in his book Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World 
(1984) in order to capture what he calls the innovative aspect of causation 
(the acquiring of new properties), as opposed to the conservative aspect, 
for which he developed the concept of causal process (see Section 4 for 
that). 
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We will adopt a definition of causal interaction that is very close to 
Salmon’s original definition: 
 
(CI) At t there is a causal interaction between objects x and y if and 
only if 
(1)  there is an intersection between x and y at t (i.e. they are in 
adjacent or identical spatial regions at t), 
(2)  x exhibits a characteristic P′ in an interval immediately 
before t, but a modified characteristic P immediately after t, 
(3)  y exhibits a characteristic Q′ in an interval immediately 
before t, but a modified characteristic Q immediately after t, 
(4)  x would have had P′ immediately after t if the intersection 
would not have occurred, and 
(5)  y would have had Q′ immediately after t if the intersection 
would not have occurred. 
 
An object can be anything in the ontology of science (e.g. atoms, 
photons, ...) or common sense (humans, chairs, trees, ...). This definition 
incorporates the basic ideas of Salmon. The main difference is that, 
according to our definition, interactions occur between two objects. In 
Salmon’s definition, an interaction is something that happens between 
two processes (see Salmon 1984, p. 171). This modification was 
suggested in Dowe 1992. The modification is not substantial (processes 
are world-lines of objects, i.e. collections of points on a space-time 
diagram that represents the history of an object). The advantage of this 
terminology is that it is more convenient in analysing every-day and 
scientific causal talk. 
Because we stick close to Salmon’s original definition, we can borrow 
his examples. Collision is the prototype of causal interaction: the 
momentum of each object is changed, this change would not have 
occurred without the collision, and the new momentum is preserved in an 
interval immediately after the collision. When a white light pulse goes 
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through a piece of red glass, this intersection is also a causal interaction: 
the light pulse becomes and remains red, while the filter undergoes an 
increase in energy because it absorbs some of the light. The glass retains 
some of the energy for some time beyond the actual moment of 
interaction. As an example of an intersection which is not a causal 
interaction, we consider two spots of light, one red and the other green, 
that are projected on a white screen. The red spot moves diagonally 
across the screen from the lower left-hand corner to the upper right-hand 
corner, while the green spot moves from the lower right-hand corner to 
the upper left-hand corner. The spots meet momentarily at the centre of 
the screen. At that moment, a yellow spot appears, but each spot resumes 
its former colour as soon as it leaves the region of intersection. No 
modification of colour persists beyond the intersection, so no causal 
interaction has occurred. 
One might object to the last example that there are no objects involved 
(if one does not regard light spots as objects) so the clauses (1)-(5) in the 
definitions are superfluous in this case. A clearer phenomenon that is not 
a causal interaction is two billiard balls lying next to each other (so 
condition (1) is satisfied, but the other conditions are violated).  
 
3.2 Let us now analyse how Salmon’s concept can be used in everyday or 
scientific causal talk. Suppose we want to make a claim about a causal 
interaction, of the following form: 
 
(CCI) At t there was a causal interaction between x and y, in which x 
acquired characteristic P and lost characteristic P′, and in 
which y acquired characteristic Q and lost characteristic Q′. 
 
Making a claim about a causal interaction presupposes a frame of 
reference that settles the level of description, the spatial scale and the 
timescale that will be used. The level of description determines the kind 
of system we talk about (e.g. individuals or groups of individuals, 
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macroscopic objects or elementary particles). The spatial scale 
determines the smallest unit of distance, and thus determines whether two 
systems are or are not in adjacent spatial regions (they are if the distance 
between them is smaller than the smallest unit of distance). Likewise, the 
timescale determines the smallest unit of time we will use, and thus 
allows us to distinguish between “sudden changes” as they occur in 
interactions, and slower evolution: we have a sudden change if and only 
if the change takes place in a period of time that is smaller than the 
smallest unit of time. Salmon does mention sudden or slow changes in his 
definition of causal interaction.3 However, he refers to intervals 
“immediately before” and “immediately after” the intersection. His use of 
the word “immediately” is important for two reasons. First, it is a vague 
term, so we need a time scale to operationalize it. Second, it implies that, 
in order to have a causal interaction, the changes in the properties of the 
objects have to occur suddenly. 
  Let us clarify this by means of a series of examples. Consider a group 
of people in a seminar room. There is a speaker that tells his audience 
things that are really new to them. The seminar lasts 59 minutes. Now 
take the following frame of reference: 
 
Objects = common sense macro objects 
Space = rooms and multiples of them (floors, buildings) 
Time = 1 hour and multiples (days, weeks, ....) 
 
In this frame of reference, a set of interactions has occurred: the speaker 
and each member of his audience were in adjacent spatial regions 
(because they were in the same room), and a sudden change has occurred 
(they learned something new within 1 hour). 
Contrast this with a different frame of reference: 
 
                                                     
3
 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing at this. 
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Objects = common sense macro objects 
Space = 1 mm distance and multiples 
Time = 5 seconds and multiples 
 
In this frame of reference, the seminar does not constitute a causal 
interaction because the distances are too big and the changes are too slow. 
However, someone inoculating me to protect me against some disease 
would be causally interacting with me: there is less than 1 mm distance 
between my body and the needle of the syringe, and there is a sudden 
change in my body (within 5 seconds, it contains a fluid it did not contain 
before the interaction). 
If we modify the last clause into: 
 
Time = 0.5 seconds and multiples 
 
the inoculation is not a causal interaction any more (because the change is 
too slow). 
In this modified frame of reference, collisions between two billiard 
balls still constitute causal interactions. However, if we take smaller units 
of space and time, these collisions cease to be causal interactions. 
We can draw two conclusions from these examples: 
(a) Salmon’s concept of causal interaction is a “skeleton concept”: it 
cannot be applied to empirical phenomena until we supplement it with a 
frame of reference as outlined above. 
(b) If something is a causal interaction given a frame of reference, 
refining the frame of reference is sufficient to ensure that the 
phenomenon fails to satisfy the conditions.  
The characteristics of the use of the concept of causal interaction are a 
consequence of the vagueness of certain words in the definition. 
Salmon’s vagueness has a great advantage: they entail that Salmon’s 
definition is a polyvalent one that can be applied in many areas of 
science, including the social sciences (see Weber 2007 for the application 
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of Salmon in the social sciences). Salmon himself expresses the hope that 
his theory is adequate for all scientific disciplines – including the 
physical, biological and social sciences – except quantum mechanics (see 
Salmon 1984, p. 278). This brings us to a question that some readers may 
have asked by now: why do we use Salmon’s theory rather than the 
conserved quantity theory developed by Phil Dowe (1992, 2000)? The 
reason is that the latter theory is clearly unable to get a grip on causal-
mechanical causation outside the realm of physics. Salmon’s theory is the 
only one that sheds light on the meaning of causal-mechanical claims 
outside the realm of physics. So we have to use that one if we want to 
cover everyday causal talk and all areas of scientific causal talk. 
Before investigating the epistemological consequences of (a) and (b), 
we want to urge that scientists are at complete liberty when choosing a 
frame of reference. They can make a clever choice, or a choice that is not 
very clever. Consider a psychologist investigating the group of people in 
a seminar room mentioned above. The psychologist is interested in 
exchange of knowledge. If the spatial scale he chooses is too refined, 
none of the phenomena he is interested in will turn out to be causal 
interactions (because the people are too far away from each other). If the 
spatial scale is appropriate, some phenomena (successful exchanges in 
which one person learns something from another) come out as causal 
interactions, while other phenomena (failed communication) comes out as 
an intersection which is not a causal interaction. Clever scientists in a 
given discipline will use an appropriate frame of reference for their 
domain: a frame of reference in which some phenomena in which they 
are interested constitute causal interactions, while others don’t. However, 
the fact that not all frames of reference are equally good (and that most 
scientists quasi-automatically choose an appropriate frame of reference) 
should not let us forget the basic points: we cannot use the concept of 
causal interaction without choosing a frame of reference (see (a) above), 
and this choice has consequences for what we label as “causal 
interaction” and what not (see (b) above). 
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4. The Consequences for the Truth Values 
of Causal Claims 
Let us now consider the epistemological implications of (a) and (b). 
Consider a person A making the following claim: 
 
This collision between two billiard balls is a causal interaction. 
 
We also have B, who negates this: 
 
This collision between two billiard balls is a not a causal interaction. 
 
We assume that both have definition (CI) in mind and apply it correctly 
(i.e. call something a causal interaction if and only if it satisfies all the 
conditions). Then there are two possible causes of the disagreement. One 
is that A and B use different frames of reference in applying the 
definition. The other is that one of them has inadequate empirical 
evidence, and therefore makes a wrong judgment. 
If the truth of a claim about causal interactions would be framework-
independent, that would entail the following:  
 
If two people disagree as to causal interactions then at least one of 
them must be wrong. 
 
However, this claim must be rejected because there is another explanation 
for the disagreement: 
 
If two people disagree as to causal interactions, they may have a 
different frame of reference. 
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So it is possible that, if two people disagree as to causal interactions, they 
both are right within their frame of reference. Hence, the truth of claims 
about causal interactions is framework-dependent. 
Before looking at causal processes, it is useful to explore further what 
is going on here. By choosing a frame of reference, we adopt a set of 
norms: a norm about what is big enough but not too big to count as an 
object, a norm about what is close enough to count as ‘adjacent’ and a 
norm about what is fast enough to count as ‘immediately’. The claim that 
something is a causal interaction is the result of a comparison of factual 
information with these norms, just a legal verdict (e.g. “This person is 
guilty of theft”) is the result of a comparison of factual information with 
legal norms. 
 
5. Causal Processes 
5.1 Causal mechanisms are more than complexes of causal interactions. 
Causation also has a conservative aspect: properties acquired in causal 
interactions are often spontaneously preserved, in what Salmon calls 
causal processes. Salmon divides processes (world lines of objects) into 
causal processes and pseudo-processes. Causal processes are capable of 
transmitting marks, pseudo-processes cannot transmit marks. Mark 
transmission is defined by Salmon as follows: 
 
Let P be a process that, in the absence of interactions with other 
processes, would remain uniform with respect to characteristic Q, which it 
would manifest consistently over an interval that includes both of the 
space-time points A and B (A≠B). Then a mark (consisting of a 
modification of Q into Q′), which has been introduced into process P by 
means of a single local interaction at point A, is transmitted to point B if 
P manifests the modification Q′ at B and at all stages of the process 
between A and B without additional interventions. (Salmon 1984, p. 148) 
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Salmon mentions material objects and electromagnetic waves as 
examples of causal processes. This is quite strange: a process is a world 
line of an object, so it is very awkward to call some objects causal 
processes. We have to make a clear distinction between objects and world 
lines of objects. If we make this distinction, we can also distinguish 
between objects that have the capacity to transmit certain modifications 
of their structure to other spatiotemporal regions (like e.g. material 
objects) and world lines of such objects (= causal processes). The 
movement of a material object is a process (world line of an object). 
Moreover, it is a causal process: the underlying object has a capacity to 
transmit marks. But the material object itself is not a causal process, since 
it is not a process. The movement of an object is a causal process, but the 
moving object itself is not.  
Like the concept of causal interaction, the concept of causal process 
presupposes an underlying reference frame which specifies the objects 
and the time and space scales. Take for instance a person that has no 
contact with anybody else for two weeks. This person can be seen as 
transmitting a mark (for instance: the beliefs he has) even if he eats, 
drinks, breathes and interacts in various other ways with his non-human 
biological environment. The beliefs can be seen as spontaneously 
preserved because no intervention of other human beings (e.g. through 
communication) is necessary to preserve them. The phrases we put in 
italics (“can be taken” and “can be seen”) are crucial because strictly 
speaking there is no mark transmission. The requirement that the mark is 
preserved “without additional interventions” (cf. the last sentence of the 
definition of mark transmission) is not satisfied: the interactions with the 
biological environment are necessary to preserve the belief (without the 
interactions, the person dies and the belief disappears). However, it is 
possible to classify causal interactions into groups, e.g. biological 
interactions and non-biological interactions. To see why such a 
distinction is useful, consider a person A with a good memory, and a 
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person B with a very bad memory (B needs repetition of the message to 
be remembered every hour). The claim that the content of the message is 
transmitted without additional non-biological interactions is true for A 
and false for B. The claim that the content of the message is preserved 
without additional interactions tout court is false for both A and B 
(without breathing, both A and B die). A clever scientist who is interested 
in phenomena related to memory will therefore disregard biological 
interactions when applying the concept of causal process. The result will 
be that he says that in A there is a mark that is transmitted, while in B 
there is no mark transmission. 
What is the upshot of this? If we want to use the concept of mark 
transmission and causal processes outside the realm of physics, we first 
have to make a decision about which types of causal interactions we will 
neglect. Without such a decision, the concepts become useless (because 
nothing in the domain we want to study will be a causal process). As with 
the frames of reference discussed in Section 3, scientists can make clever 
and non-clever choices about which types of causal interactions to 
neglect. Of course most scientists quasi-automatically make appropriate 
choices, but still there is a choice to be made. 
 
5.2 The fact that mark transmission and spontaneous preservation are 
relative to a choice about causal interactions to be neglected, has 
epistemological implications similar to the ones we described in Section 
4 with respect to causal interactions. If the truth of a claim about causal 
processes would be framework-independent, that would entail the 
following:  
 
If two people disagree as to causal processes then at least one of them 
must be wrong. 
 
However, this claim must be rejected because there is another explanation 
for the disagreement: 
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If two people disagree as to causal processes, they may have taken 
different decisions about types of causal interactions to neglect. 
 
So it is possible that, if two people disagree as to causal processes, they 
both are right within their framework. Hence, the truth of claims about 
causal processes is framework-dependent. 
 
6. Types of Perspective-Relativity: 
Overview and Comparison 
The aim of Sections 3-5 was to show that the truth value of claims about 
causal interactions and causal processes are perspective-relative. Menzies 
has shown that the truth of causal claims in the difference making sense is 
perspective-relative in two specific ways: the truth value may depend on 
the contrast that is explained (Section 2.1), or on the alternative causes 
we have in mind (Section 2.2). What we have shown in 3-5 is that the 
truth value of claims about causal interactions is perspective-relative in a 
third way (it depends on the choice of a frame of reference with objects, 
time scale and spatial scale) and that the truth value of claims about 
causal processes is perspective-relative in a fourth way (it depends on a 
choice about types of causal interactions to be neglected). Distinguishing 
these four ways is important because “perspective” is a vague term and, 
as a consequence, the claim that the truth value of causal claims is 
perspective-relative is also rather vague. The challenge for defenders of 
perspective-relativity of causal claims is not only to show that there is 
such a perspective-relativity, but also to show what it consists in. Menzies 
has done that for difference making concepts of causation, we have done 
it for causal interactions and causal processes. The results may be 
summarised as follows: 
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Perspective-relativity of causal claims 
comes in at least two types 
Context-dependence, 
which comes in at least two 
subtypes 
Framework-dependence, 
which comes in at least two 
subtypes 
Dependence 
on contrast to 
be explained 
Dependence 
on alternative 
causes 
considered 
Dependence on 
frame of 
reference 
(objects, time, 
space) 
Dependence on 
decision about 
types of causal 
interaction to 
be neglected 
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 
 
These four types are interesting in themselves because they give a 
positive content to perspective-relativity. However, in this paper they 
mainly function as a way to structure the discussion: we discuss the 
consequences of type 1 in Section 7, type 2 in Section 8 and types 3 and 4 
in Section 9. 
 
7. Dependence on the Contrast to be 
Explained and (EPCC) 
Dependence on the contrast to be explained (perspective-relativity of type 
1) reveals that disagreements on causal claims are sometimes due to a 
specific feature of natural language, viz. that people sometimes do not 
distinguish clearly between causation (a relation in the world) and causal 
explanation (an epistemic relation between propositions). There is a 
systematic way to disambiguate the claims that are at stake: use the term 
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“cause” to denote causal relations in the world and “causally explains” to 
denote the epistemic relation.4 
 Let us illustrate this by means of the example of 2.1. The initial 
situation is that A accepts this: 
 
The famine in India in year x was caused by the drought. 
The famine in India was not caused by the failure of the government 
to build up food reserves. 
 
Person B rejects these claims. After agreeing that the term “cause” should 
only be used to denote difference-making relations in the world, it is very 
well possible that A and B agree about the following (we use italics to 
denote that there has been a shift in the meaning of the word “cause”): 
 
The famine in India in year x was caused by the drought. 
The famine in India in year x was caused by the failure to build up 
food reserves. 
 
Suppose that A and B also agree the about the following factual claims: 
 
There was drought in Pakistan in year x. 
The Pakistani government built up food reserves in year x. 
 
Under this assumption, A and B will also agree to accept the following 
claim: 
 
The difference in famine between India and Pakistan in year x is 
causally explained by the failure of the Indian government to build up 
food reserves. 
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And they would agree to reject the following claim: 
 
The difference in famine between India and Pakistan in year x is 
causally explained by the drought.  
 
The latter claim would be rejected not because it conflicts with their 
causal beliefs, but because it conflicts with their factual beliefs (this claim 
presupposes the factual belief that there was no drought in Pakistan in 
year x).  
 Complete agreement is not the only possible outcome of the 
disambiguation process. It is also possible that it reveals a deeper 
disagreement about which causal relations there are in the world. For 
instance, it is possible that after disambiguation A and B find out that 
they disagree about whether food reserves can prevent famines or not. 
The disambiguation process may also reveal disagreements about factual 
beliefs (while there is agreement in causal beliefs in the strict sense). In 
both cases, the initial disagreement is resolved and replaced with a more 
fundamental disagreement. 
 The upshot of this is that perspective-relativity of type 1 does not 
support (EPCC) because the conflict is only apparent. More careful use of 
the term “cause” either makes the conflict disappear or reveals a serious 
but different conflict. 
 
8. Dependence on the Alternative Cause 
and (EPCC) 
We distinguish here between standard and non-standard difference-
making claims. Standard difference-making claims are those in which the 
alternative cause is not explicitly mentioned. Claims that do explicitly 
mention the alternative cause are labelled non-standard. The labels 
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reflect a property of natural language: most claims we make are standard 
claims, non-standard claims do not occur very often. 
 Below we will argue that dependence on the alternative cause does not 
support (EPCC) either. However, it supports a weak variant of it: 
 
(EPCC*) For every standard difference-making claim we make, it is 
possible to formulate a conflicting difference-making claim 
that is equally warranted. 
 
We use the example of 2.2 to illustrate this. We start with a standard 
claim: 
 
 Taking the 100 mg dose was a cause of the patient’s recovery. 
 
Assume that we accept this claim after a reasoning process in which we 
have compared the 100 mg dose with taking no dose at all. It then 
suffices to repeat the same line of reasoning with a 99 mg or 101 mg dose 
as alternative cause in order to arrive at the following, equally warranted 
conclusion: 
 
 Taking the 100 mg dose was not a cause of the patient’s recovery. 
 
In general, it suffices to take an alternative cause that is close enough to 
the real cause event in the original causal claim in order to arrive at a 
conflicting but equally warranted claim which denies the causal relation 
put forward in the original claim. This supports (EPCC*). 
 Now consider the three corresponding non-standard claims: 
 
Taking the 100 mg dose, as opposed to no dose, was a cause of the 
patient’s recovery. 
Taking the 100 mg dose, as opposed to a 99 mg dose, was not a cause 
of the patient’s recovery. 
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Taking the 100 mg dose, as opposed to a 101 mg dose, was not a 
cause of the patient’s recovery. 
 
By building in the perspective into the claim, we now have claims that do 
not conflict with each other. So for non-standard claims it is impossible to 
create conflicting equally warranted claims. This is why perspective-
relativity of type 2 does not entail (EPCC). 
 The line of reasoning developed till now in principle still allows for a 
form of relativism: if all perspectives would be equally good (i.e. equally 
interesting from a practical or theoretical point of view) it would suffice 
picking an appropriate perspective if you want to accept or reject some 
causal claim5. However, not all perspectives are equally interesting. 
Comparing a 100 mg dose to a 99 mg dose is arguably less interesting 
than comparing it to no dose. In general, it is important to see that, as 
soon as we make non-standard claims, disagreements may arise about 
whether some causal claims (made within a certain perspective) are 
interesting. That is the price we have to pay for avoiding the epistemic 
predicament of conflicting equally warranted difference-making claims. 
 
9. Frame-Work Dependence and EPCC 
We start with perspective-relativity of type 3 (dependence on frame of 
reference). As in Section 8, it is useful to introduce a distinction between 
standard and non-standard claims. Standard causal interaction claims are 
those in which the frame of reference is not explicitly mentioned. Claims 
that do explicitly mention the frame of reference are labelled non-
standard causal interaction claims. Again, the labels reflect a property of 
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natural language: most claims we make are standard claims, non-standard 
claims do not occur very often. With this terminology in place, we can 
formulate a second weakened version of (EPCC): 
 
(EPCC**) For every standard causal interaction we make, it is possible 
to formulate a conflicting causal interaction claim that is 
equally warranted. 
 
Let us give an example, which has the same structure as the example of 
Section 8. We start with a standard claim: 
 
 This collision between two billiard balls is a causal interaction. 
 
Assume that we accept this claim after a reasoning process in which we 
have used common sense objects, 1 mm as smallest spatial unit and 1 sec 
as smallest time unit. Within this framework (which we label framework 
[O,S,T]), the conditions of (CI) are satisfied. It then suffices to repeat the 
same line of reasoning with molecules as entities and a much smaller 
spatial scale and time scale (let is call this framework [O′,S′,T′]) in order 
to arrive at the following, equally warranted conclusion: 
 
 This collision between two billiard balls was not a causal interaction. 
  
Within the second framework the collision involves too many objects that 
come not close enough to each other, and the changes are much too slow. 
In general, it suffices to take a sufficiently more fine-grained frame of 
reference in order to arrive at a conflicting but equally warranted claim 
which denies that there was a causal interaction. This supports (EPCC**). 
 Now consider the corresponding non-standard claims: 
 
Within framework [O,S,T], this collision between two billiard balls is 
a causal interaction. 
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Within framework [O′,S′,T′], this collision between two billiard balls 
is not a causal interaction. 
 
By building in the perspective into the claim, we now have claims that do 
not conflict with each other. So for non-standard claims it is impossible to 
create conflicting equally warranted claims. This is why perspective-
relativity of type 3 does not entail (EPCC). A parallel argument can be 
developed for perspective-relativity of type 4 (dependence on types of 
causal interactions that are neglected). 
 As in Section 8, there still can be some form of epistemic relativism if 
all frames of reference are equally interesting. However, as we have 
already argued at the end of Section 3, this is not the case. 
 
10. Conclusion 
The bulk of this paper was devoted to showing that the truth value of 
claims about causal interactions and causal processes is perspective-
relative (Sections 3-5). Combining this result with the work of Menzies 
enabled us to distinguish different types of perspective-relativity (Section 
6). In Sections 7 till 9 we have shown that none of the types of 
perspective-relativity we have distinguished leads to epistemic relativism. 
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